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India is a great military power in the world. It is fortifying its military at a fast pace. Thus, 
the other states in the world have raised a serious question: What drives India to 
modernize its military? This thesis borrows Sagan’s three models—security model, 
norms model, and domestic-politics model—to address the research question of why 
India is expanding its military capability. India’s military expansion is analyzed using 
two case studies on nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers to determine which model is the 
most applicable.  
The evidence demonstrated in this thesis suggests that no single model can fully 
explain this question. The three models—the security, the norms, and the domestic-
politics models—are all indispensable pieces to the puzzle of explaining India’s military 
expansion. However, this expansion could result in a security dilemma that provokes its 
hostile neighbors toward an arms race. That is to say, India’s behavior of military 
expansion might destabilize the region of South Asia. 
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Military expansion depends on a state’s security needs, wealth, ambition, and its 
technological resources as well as its domestic politics. According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 2013 “Trends in International Arms 
Transfers” report, India has been the world’s biggest weapons buyer since 2010 and has 
purchased 14 percent of all international arms imports. By contrast, China and Pakistan 
each only purchased 5 percent of all international arms imports.1 In the past, India seems 
to have paid particular attention to China’s military decisions. In 2013, China declared 
that its aircraft carrier had completed testing and was ready for combat. In addition, 
China announced that it was initiating ballistic missiles and space programs to show off 
its technological capabilities. After China’s announcement, India immediately announced 
that it was building its first indigenous aircraft carrier and planning the next Mars 
exploration program in 2017, demonstrating that its military capabilities could compete 
with those of other major powers.2 
A. PURPOSE 
According to a Global Firepower (GFP) report, India is the fourth largest military 
power in the world.3 India is still fortifying its military at a fast pace. Thus, the other 
states in the world have raised some serious questions: What drives India to modernize its 
military? Is India just worrying about its hostile neighbors, or is it seeking to become 
Asia’s biggest military power? Many states around the world, especially in the region, 
want to understand India’s real intentions for military-capability expansion because this 
                                                 
1 Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2013,”  
SIPRI Fact Sheet, (March 2014): 4, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf.  
2 The Times of India, “India Plans Another Mars Mission in 2017–20,” July 18, 2014, 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-plans-another-Mars-mission-in-2017-20/articleshow/
38565995.cms.  
3 Global Firepower, “India Military Strength,”  accessed May 27, 2014, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=india. Global Firepower 
(GFP) provides the latest ranking of world military powers whose nuclear capability is not taken into 
account. However, the GFP ranking is based on each state’s potential conventional war-making capabilities 
across land, sea, and air. The final ranking also incorporates values related to resources, finances, and 
geography. 
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expansion might lead to international tension. India’s Military Modernization, by Stephen 
P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, shows that India’s economic growth has slowed since 2010; 
however, the growth of its military spending and military weapons importation has never 




Figure 1.  India’s Military Expenditure, Weapons Importation, and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) Growth since 20095 
Accordingly, this thesis investigates why India has continued to expand its 
military capability since the partition of 1947. To clarify, it does not address why India 
possesses or purchases a specific weapon, but instead, why India expands its military 
power in general. India is already a great power in South Asia that owns robust 
conventional and nuclear capabilities to provide solid deterrence and security, but it is 
researching new technology and manufacturing new weapons such as ballistic missiles 
                                                 
4 Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), xi. 
5 Wezeman and Wezeman, “Trends in international arms transfers, 2013;” GDP Growth (Annual %), 
The World Bank, Accessed May 21, 2014, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG; 
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and aircraft carriers. Many articles discuss the reasons why a state owns nuclear bombs, 
explain past conflicts and border disputes that affect India’s military expansion, and 
praise India for its economic growth, but most of the literature does not address the 
reasons for India’s continued military expansion broadly. As a result, this thesis seeks to 
explain why India keeps expanding its military using Sagan’s three models: security, 
norms, and domestic-politics.6 This thesis applies these three models to two case studies: 
nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers. 
This thesis generates hypotheses for each of the competing models. If the security 
model is correct regarding India’s motivation, I presume that India might want to expand 
its military capability to provide robust deterrence and national security. If the norms 
model is correct, however, I presume that India might believe that the expansion of its 
military capability can enhance its international prestige and national identity. Finally, if 
the domestic-politics model is accurate, which means that domestic-politics concerns 
motivate military expansion instead of security or norms concerns, I presume that Indian 
policymakers might want to use military expansion to increase their public support. This 
thesis argues that the security model is the most powerful explanation for India’s military 
expansion.  
This thesis is divided into five main sections to answer the research question. 
Chapter I discusses the research question, background information on prior conflicts in 
South Asia, and the geopolitical conditions of India, China, and Pakistan. Furthermore, 
Chapter I compares the economy, population, and geopolitics among India, Pakistan, and 
China to demonstrate that India has the potential to become the regional hegemon. 
Additionally, the comparison reveals that China is the most probable threat to India. It 
also establishes that Pakistan, as a weaker state, likes to launch small-scale wars or 
conflicts to undermine India, and India has a great location to become a hegemonic 
power. Chapter II explains the three expansion models. This chapter uses the three 
models to explain why a state expands its military power, and it provides characteristics 
of the three models. Chapter III describes India’s military expansion and applies the three 
                                                 
6 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–97): 54–86. 
 4 
models to determine the reasons why India is expanding its military capability. Finally, 
Chapter IV offers an overview of the thesis and suggests implications for the region. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The study of India’s military expansion is significant for three main reasons. First, 
there is a history of conflict in the region of South Asia. The region’s territorial disputes 
largely contribute to its instability. India has a territorial issue with all of its neighbors—
China, Pakistan, and Nepal. The dispute over Kashmir is especially significant and is a 
triangular problem among India, China, and Pakistan. Various historical conflicts have 
been caused by this particular dispute. For example, India and Pakistan have had several 
conflicts since 1965. Such territory disputes are still a major issue among India, China, 
and Pakistan today. 
Second, the region’s conflict could escalate due to the prevalence of weapons and 
tension. Analyzing India’s military expansion is crucial because the region’s tension 
might lead to a full-scale nuclear war. The United States and Soviet Union during the 
Cold War illustrate how an arms race might cause serious conflicts. The arms race 
between the United States and Russia increased both countries’ military forces and their 
fear of each other. India and China are two major powers in Asia that quarrel with one 
another, and Pakistan also owns powerful nuclear weapons to deter its neighbors. The 
existing arms race among the three states might affect security and stability around the 
region or even around the world. War seems probable for South Asia in the future, so 
India’s new government must determine how to deal with the region’s tension and avoid 
conflicts. South Asia is filled with tension due to its monumental weapons importation 
and nuclear expansion. India, China, and Pakistan have been the top three arms importers 
in the world since 2009.7 Additionally, these three states are the only states that continue 
to expand their nuclear arsenals.8 They are unlike other states that own nuclear weapons; 
other states are decreasing their nuclear weapons under the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). 
                                                 
7 Wezeman and Wezeman, “Trends in international arms transfers, 2013,” 4. 
8 Shannon N. Kile and Phillip Schell, “Military Spending and Armaments: Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI, 
Accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nuclear-forces. 
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Up to now, India and Pakistan have completely rejected the NPT. Therefore, if a 
territorial dispute or conflict breaks out, nuclear war may well launch in the region.  
Third, applying these three models to specific cases in India as well as examining 
other cases in other countries, helps to determine the utility of these models. That is to 
say, my thesis aims to help prevent conflict both in South Asia and throughout the world. 
If people can understand why other states expand their militaries, conflict and war may 
be reduced or avoided altogether. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this background is to provide a basic understanding of India’s past 
and present situation in order to analyze why India might want to expand its military 
capability and why policymakers believe that the expansion will lead to a bright future. 
Therefore, this background demonstrates India’s prior military struggles and the current 
situation of the economy, population, and geopolitics among India and its neighbors. 
India’s previous conflicts might assist in explaining reasons for India’s expansion of 
military capability. Additionally, surveying the status of India’s economy, population, 
and geopolitics as compared to those of China and Pakistan might help explain why India 
wants to expand its military capability. 
1. Conflicts with India’s Neighbors 
Studying the India-Pakistan and Sino-Indian security relationships can help 
illuminate India’s military policy and predict future trends, and these prior conflicts may 
be one of the reasons why India continually modernizes its military. Conflicts among 
China, India, and Pakistan and several border crises have been intermittent since the 
partition. More importantly, no sign of permanent resolution among these three states 
seems possible in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the underlying reasons for conflicts 
among them are an important security issue. The partition of 1947 made uncompromising 
struggles among India, Pakistan, and China unavoidable due to ambiguous geographic 
boundaries, irreconcilable ideologies and identities, and an uneven distribution of 
resources and power. 
 6 
An ambiguous geographic boundary is one of the most significant contributing 
factors to the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. In terms of the three major 
wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971 and the border crises, the disagreement over the territorial 
settlement of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is the main cause of these enduring conflicts. 
Violence seemed to be inevitable, with ambiguous boundaries playing the main role in 
the conflict between India and Pakistan.  
The Kashmir War of 1947 was launched by Pakistan and ended by the United 
Nations’ involvement on January 1, 1949.9 Most important of all, Pakistan achieved two 
goals from this war. First, Pakistan raised the territorial dispute as an international issue 
that attracted the United Nations’ attention. Pakistan could use this third party to solve 
the territorial disputes in South Asia. On the other hand, India wanted to limit the 
territorial issue to a bilateral one. Second, Pakistan successfully captured roughly one-
third of Kashmir from India’s control.10 Although Pakistan did not win this war, Pakistan 
knew that this kind of small-scale war was a good strategy to cope with India because it 
could bleed India and solidify itself. 
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, also known as the Second Kashmir War, 
focused on the territorial dispute over Kashmir. As with the First Kashmir War, the 
United Nations played an important role in stopping the deadlock of the Indo-Pakistani 
War of 1965. The United Nations Security Council figured out a resolution for the 
Second Kashmir War on September 20, 1965. Separately, India and Pakistan accepted 
this resolution on September 21 and 22.11 Ultimately, this war did not change anything 
but showed Pakistan’s proneness to conflict with India. Under the Tashkent Agreement, 
both sides agreed to maintain the status quo and peacefully solve future disputes.12  
                                                 
9 Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947, (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1994), 14. 
10 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in 
South Asia, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 12. 
11 Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia, 48. 
12 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 14. 
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Pakistan launched the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 with air strikes on India’s 
military bases around its northwestern region on December 3, 1971.13 India fought back 
quickly, and the Indian Air Force (IAF) destroyed some Pakistani air bases. India’s 
overwhelming victory proved that its military power was superior to Pakistan. At the end 
of the war, both India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement, agreeing to cease 
military conflict around the border and focusing on two aspects.14 First, both sides came 
to an agreement to resolve future disputes “bilaterally.” 15  Additionally, the Simla 
Agreement also transformed the cease-fire line into the Line of Control (LOC).  
Besides the three major wars over J&K, there were other border crises. The Kargil 
War of 1998 was India’s first time to use air strikes to remind Pakistan of its strong 
conventional power. Kargil is a town that crossed the LOC in the Himalayas. Under 
American diplomatic pressure, Pakistan withdrew from India’s territory and ended the 
war.16 Additionally, Pakistani terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament on December 13, 
2001, and caused the border crisis of 2001. The Indian Parliament event took place right 
after the J&K Legislative Assembly bombing and 9/11 on the same year. Consequently, 
India’s Union Cabinet made a “preemptive war” doctrine and promised to “liquidate the 
terrorists and their sponsors wherever they are, whoever they are.”17 Then, India sent its 
800,000 troops to the Indo-Pakistan border and announced that India was ready for a 
fight. Both India and Pakistan’s armed forces were prepared and kept on high alert 
because of their long-standing enmity. India made war seem imminent but withdrew its 
troops under the United States’ diplomatic pressure in October 2002.18  
India and Pakistan have not drawn a clear territorial boundary over the state of 
J&K since the partition of 1947, and India will not easily give up Kashmir for two 
                                                 
13 Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia, 81. 
14 Mithilesh Kumar Singh, Military Strength of India & Pakistan, (Delhi, India: Prashant Publishing 
House, 2008), 225. 
15 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 15. 
16 Russell F. Leng, “Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan 
Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 114–15. 
17 Ibid., 121–22. 
18 Ibid., 122. 
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reasons. First, giving away Kashmir would present weakness. Second, the Indian 
government worries about the chain reaction of independence that could happen in 
different provinces of India. If India gave Kashmir is independence, other regions would 
want independence as well. India is a multiethnic state that just received independence 
from the British in 1947, so if India gave away Kashmir, other provinces would likely 
follow suit. That is to say, India is motivated to make every effort to keep Kashmir under 
its control. Although India is not willing to actively fight with Pakistan over unsettled 
territory, it will fight for its current territorial integrity. 
On the other hand, Pakistan argues that Kashmir should belong to Pakistan 
because the majority of the population is Muslim. Pakistan has tried many approaches 
such as unilaterally making a new map to redefine the boundary between it and India. 
Additionally, Pakistan refuses to compromise during the negotiations. Moreover, 
Pakistan is dedicated to using armed force to seize the predominantly Muslim province 
from India’s control because taking a firm stand on unsettled territory is one way to get 
support from a domestic electorate. Along the same line, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
in India used anti-Muslim propaganda to grow its political power and win campaigns in 
1992.19 
Along the same lines, the boundary between India and China has been obscured 
and argued over for more than five decades since the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The Sino-
Indian War of 1962 is the biggest conflict of many territorial disputes with heavy 
casualties. On September 8, 1962, the Chinese Army crossed over the Kameng division 
of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).20 China’s troops entered India’s side of the 
McMahon Line, which is in the east of India’s frontier. India used armed forces to expel 
China’s soldiers out of India’s territory. China’s last and significant assault occurred from  
November 16–19, 1962; then, China announced a ceasefire and withdrew its troops from 
                                                 
19 Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An 
Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 193. 
20 Parshotam Mehra, Essays in Frontier History: India, China, and the Disputed Border (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 180. 
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the line of actual control.21 India has never relaxed its vigilance against China since this 
war in 1962.  
Border disputes between India and China significantly contribute to the 
tumultuous relationship between these two countries. The frontier between these two 
giants in Asia is the only border China has yet to determine. None of the repeated talks 
and negotiations have conclusively set a clear boundary between India and China. The 
two great powers went through several conferences and negotiations about border issues 
from 1981 to 1987. Bilateral boundary experts held many Joint Working Group meetings 
from 1988 to 2002. The leader of each side wanted to delimit the boundary and even 
went to visit the other state personally several times. Although numerous attempts were 
made by both sides of the border issue, it remains a puzzle and an endless argument. 
Therefore, border violations, border aggression, and illegal LOC crossings are emerging 
endlessly.  
Two different religious ideologies and national identities between India and 
Pakistan have made conflicts not just intractable, but also persistent. The different 
religious groups had already been diffused all over the country before the partition. 
However, the withdrawal of the British made the differences of religion, language, and 
lifestyle become the decisive factors in the Indo-Pakistani partition.22 Hitherto, these two 
opposing ideologies and identities still have deeply influenced them. Notably, the basic 
religious principles are different between the Hindus on the Indian side and the Muslims 
on Pakistan’s side. Hindus live under a caste system, but Muslims believe that every man 
is equal; Hindus argue that there are multiple gods, but Muslims believe that there is only 
one God. Therefore, the foundations of these two states conflict with each other, and the 
differences seem unchangeable. Moreover, ancient history, religious habits, and ethnic 
origins are other factors of identity that contribute to the enduring conflicts as well. Once 
the violence of the partition was launched, it became very difficult to overcome the 
hatred that already existed between Hindus and Muslims. 
                                                 
21 Mehra, Essays in Frontier History, 180–81, 187. 
22 Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” 181. 
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Pakistan is dissatisfied about what it considers an unfair allotment of territory and 
weapons, and this uneven distribution also leads to a power asymmetry between India 
and Pakistan. Pakistan is not just disappointed; as Liaquat’s speech suggests, “Our people 
have gone mad.”23 The irritated population motivated and supported the military leader 
to run the government. Pakistan, the weaker state, is ruled by militarily-oriented decision-
makers who have a tendency to put security issues at the center of their policies and use 
the armed forces to solve disputes instead of other diplomatic and peaceful approaches. 
Additionally, most of the policy-makers in Pakistan have believed that territory, 
institution, physical assets, and resources should have equal distribution since the 
independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of 
Pakistan, said that the Pakistani people are disappointed in the result of the partition and 
see it as “an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse award.” 24  The Pakistani 
population thinks that violence would pay back the insults. 
Power asymmetry has made Indo-Pakistani relations contribute to enduring 
conflicts. The weaker state has made a strategy of using non-state actors to continually 
launch conflicts or start crises. For Pakistan, its non-state actors include trained Mujahids 
and specialized terrorism that could undermine the foundation of India’s resources and 
power without waging a full-scale war. 25 Moreover, Pakistan has developed nuclear 
weapons since 1990—the “great equalizers”—that have deterred India from enlarging the 
war. 
Unsettled territorial issues, contrasting ideologies and identities, and resource and 
power asymmetry are significant factors in the inevitable and enduring conflicts since the 
partition of 1947. The region’s territorial disputes largely contribute to its instability. The 
dispute over Kashmir is especially significant, and various historical conflicts have been 
caused by this particular dispute. Additionally, incompatible religious ideologies and 
national identities have made the Indo-Pakistani rivalry the enduring struggle of two 
                                                 
23 Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins, Freedom at Midnight (New Delhi: Vikas, 1997), 382. 
24 Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 127. 
25 Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan Conflict,” 181. 
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conflicting foundations. Finally, uneven distribution of resources and power in the 
partition has caused power asymmetry and dissatisfied the population of Pakistan. 
Comparing poorly with India, Pakistan’s territory, economy, and military capabilities 
make it insecure. Pakistan makes an effort to achieve parity through its nuclear arms race 
and non-state actor sabotage. 
On and off since 1947, India has experienced many conflicts with its neighbors; 
however, India appears to possess sufficient military capabilities to defend against both 
China and Pakistan and to protect its interests in these regions. Therefore, there is no 
obvious reason to explain why India needs to expand its military capability. 
2. Comparison of Economy, Population, and Geopolitics among India’s 
Neighbors 
Economy, population, territory, and coastline are key features of a state that show 
latent power.26 These variables closely relate to a state’s military expansion, as John J. 
Mearsheimer states in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: “abundant wealth and a 
large population are prerequisites for building formidable military forces.”27 As shown in 
Table 1, comparing the economy, population, and geopolitics among India and its 
neighbors demonstrates at least three significant factors. First, India’s economy, 
population, territory, and length of coastline make Pakistan insecure. Second, comparing 
India to China and factoring in its geopolitical condition, India has the potential to 
become a hegemonic power. Third, although India has good geopolitical prerequisites to 
become Asia’s hegemon, India still cannot compare to China. Table 1 illustrates that 
China has the absolute advantages over India, and China’s economic and natural 
superiority would seem to cause India insecurity. This danger might explain why India 
wants to expand its military capabilities. These are all possible variables that India might 
take into account when modernizing its military. 
A strong state needs a big economy to support its military, to provide political 
goods, and to gain more capital from investment. China and India have two of the fastest 
                                                 
26 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2014), 55. 
27 Ibid., 56. 
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growing economies in the world. China is now the world’s second largest economy. 
According to Gurcharan Das’ analysis, China will surpass the United States and become 
the largest economy in the near future. 28  Therefore, to compete, India must grow 
substantially to equal or overtake China as an economic power. According to a Hindustan 
Times report on January 16, 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised that 
economic growth would be his key element of government policy. 29 Comparatively, 
Table 1 shows that Pakistan’s economy is inferior to those of India and China. Pakistan’s 
weak economy cannot afford conventional military expansion to compete with India. 
India’s military superiority has contributed to Pakistan’s sense of insecurity since the 
partition of 1947.30 Additionally, Table 1 demonstrates that, as previously stated, India 
needs to continually spur its economic growth to catch up with and to compete with 
China. 
Notwithstanding the risks of abnormal demographics such as those of China, high 
population states generally have the advantages of economic growth and therefore, larger 
militaries. Compared to Pakistan’s population, those of China and India are the largest 
and second largest states in the world, and their large populations can provide a bigger 
military force and labor force. Furthermore, Pakistan’s population is only about 15 
percent of India’s population; that is one of the reasons Pakistan is less competitive than 
India.  
Bigger territory means that a state could deploy its military power more widely, 
collect more tax, and explore more natural resources. Territorial dispute is the reason why 
India had conflicts with China and Pakistan and also the reason for some historical wars. 
Nowadays, India still has had territorial disputes with its neighbors such as Kashmir. 
Pakistan’s territory is smaller than India’s, but China is nearly three times larger than 
India. China is India’s biggest hostile neighbor. 
                                                 
28 Gurcharan Das, “The India Model,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July/August 2006): 2. 
29 “Modi Blames UPA’s ‘Socialist Priorities’ for Economic Gloom,” Hindustan Times, January 16, 
2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/allaboutnarendramodi/modi-blames-upa-s-socialist-
priorities-for-economic-gloom/article1-1173365.aspx.  
30 Khan, The Great Partition, 127. 
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Table 1.   Comparison and Ranking of the Economy, Population, and 
Geopolitical Variables among India, China, and Pakistan31  
              State 





(467.4% of India) 
0.232(44th) 
(12.4% of India) 
Population 1,210,193,444(2nd) 1,350,695,000(1
st) 
(111.5% of India) 
186,693,906(6th) 
(15.4% of India) 
Territory(km2) 3,287,590(7th) 9,596,961(4
th) 
(291.9% of India) 
796,095(36th) 
(23.4% of India) 




(192.9% of India) 
1,046(74th) 
(13.9% of India) 
 
A long coastline is a significant element of a forceful Navy. A robust Navy is a 
symbol of hegemony because a state’s control of the ocean means it controls the world at 
the same time, and the United States is a very good example that uses a powerful Navy to 
bring its influence into each corner of the world. India’s location right in the middle of 
the upper Indian Ocean area provides India a good chance to dominate the Indian Ocean 
and ever further. On the contrary, compared to India, Pakistan lacks a long coastline to 
provide enough naval bases to support a strong Navy. However, China’s coastline is 
nearly twice as long as that of India and can use that advantage to deploy more naval 
power.  
According to a comparison of geopolitical variables, India has the latent ability to 
become a military power. Enormous mountains and a far distance of border area between 
China and India challenge China’s power projection to potentially threaten India. 
However, China is still India’s major concern, and Pakistan also cannot be ignored 
because of its nuclear weapons. Actually, India’s neighbors are not only China and 
Pakistan, but also Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and 
Bhutan. However, by comparing the economy, population, territory, and coastline of the 
                                                 
31 GDP (Current US$), The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/
countries?order=wbapi_data_value_2013+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc. GDP at 
purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. Wikipedia, s.v. “India,” 
last modified May 20, 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India; Wikipedia, s.v. “China,” last modified May 
20, 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China; Wikipedia, s.v. “Pakistan,” last modified May 22, 2015, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan. 
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former states, the latter states are too small to be threatening. Furthermore, those states 
are not only small but also failed. For example, five of India’s neighbors— Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, and Sri Lanka—are put into the list of failed states in 
Foreign Policy magazine’s 2010 index.32 Overall, except for China and Pakistan, the rest 
of India’s neighbors are not a big concern. As a result, this paper uses China and Pakistan 
to evaluate the reason why India is so eager to expand its military. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To answer the overarching research question of India’s military expansion, a sub-
question must be addressed: What is military expansion? In this thesis, military 
expansion means that a state upgrades either the quantity or performance of its military 
personnel or equipment in any of its service branches instead of conquering another state 
to expand its territory. Additionally, military expenditure and weapons possession alone 
do not equate to military expansion. That is to say, weapons possession is only one aspect 
of military expansion, and the reasons for owning a specific weapon cannot explain 
military expansion as a whole; an individual state may have a unique motivation for 
owning a specific military weapon. 
This thesis borrows Sagan’s three models—security model, norms model, and 
domestic-politics model—to address the research question of why India is expanding its 
military capability. Sagan’s three models provide an explanation for why a state develops 
nuclear bombs, and these three models are broad enough to explain a state’s decision to 
expand its conventional military power as well. The security model suggests that 
international threats exist in the anarchic international system and motivate a state’s 
military expansion to provide robust national security. The norms model suggests that 
international prestige and national identity motivate a state, while the domestic-politics 
model suggests that bureaucratic politics and parochial interests actually motivate 
military expansion. This thesis further introduces Sagan’s three models in the literature 
review, and then explains these three models in depth in Chapter II.  
                                                 
32 Walter C. Ladwig III, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a 
Conventional Great Power?” Asian Survey 50, no. 6 (November/December 2010): 1169.  
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India’s military expansion is analyzed using two case studies to determine which 
model is the most applicable. I selected the case study approach for two reasons.33 First, 
the case study is a better way to test this thesis’ expansion theory because it pinpoints 
decisive evidence. 34  Another reason is that the case study can explain the causal 
relationship between independent and dependent variables more effectively than other 
methods.35 In other words, case studies can analyze the chronological progression of 
historical events and explain the reasons why India has expanded its military so far. 
Each case will compare India’s military expansion and timeline of empirical 
events with those of its regional neighbors, China and Pakistan, to show that India is 
continuing to expand its military power despite already being one of the great powers. 
That is to say, case studies offer explanations for India’s military expansion by 
comparing a timeline of Indian policymakers’ decisions with those of other states’ leaders 
and by focusing on India’s conflicts, economic growth, and political factors in the context 
of other states. 
The first case study uses India’s nuclear weapons, which are the most powerful 
and the most symbolic. If India’s nuclear expansion was motivated by the security model, 
we would expect India to use nuclear expansion to deter China and Pakistan from 
launching full-scale nuclear war and to punish any adversaries that first use nuclear 
weapons. Additionally, if the security model motivated India’s expansion, India would 
continue establishing a bigger nuclear arsenal until it gained relative power and 
challenged Asia’s nuclear hegemon—China. If India expands its nuclear power based on 
the norms model, India would develop nuclear weapons to earn international prestige and 
national identity from its nuclear expansion. Additionally, if the norms model is correct, 
India would continually increase the number of nuclear weapons to symbolize nuclear 
power. If India expands its nuclear power according to the domestic-politics model, 
Indian politicians might gain a reputation and support from the domestic electorate. 
                                                 
33 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 55. 
34 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 54. 
35 Ibid. 
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Additionally, defense and scientific organizations might drive nuclearization due to the 
great benefits that would be afforded to them.  
The second case study uses aircraft carriers to demonstrate which model best 
explains India’s conventional weapon expansion. If India expanded its sea power based 
on the security model, India would be defending against its regional threats by using 
aircraft carriers to provide robust deterrence and sea control of the Indian Ocean. 
Additionally, if the security model is correct, then India would maintain or slightly 
increase the military share of GDP to greatly quicken the pace of building more aircraft 
carriers to confront China’s rising maritime power and to maintain a regional maritime 
hegemon with relative power and substantial sea power that could protect its regional 
interests, such as foreign trade and energy. If the norms model is correct, India would 
build more aircraft carriers to symbolize a great sea power and shape its national 
identity. 36  If India’s decision-making was motivated by the domestic-politics model, 
Indian officials might believe that purchasing or constructing aircraft carriers could earn 
more public support and benefit the indigenous industry. In other words, military-related 
industries, naval senior officers, and politicians would drive India’s naval modernization. 
In the case study chapter, this thesis uses empirical evidence to analyze which model is 
the best explanation.  
                                                 
36 “Total Aircraft Carrier Strength by Country,” Global Firepower, accessed May 31, 2014, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-aircraft-carriers.asp. 
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II. THREE EXPANSION MODELS 
Generally, the process of military expansion depends on a state’s security 
concerns, geographic conditions, economic backing, and domestic politics. For example, 
regarding security concerns, Iran is not a wealthy state and faces economic sanctions due 
to its weapons possession, but it still wants to pursue nuclear development because most 
of its neighbors are nuclear weapons holders.37 Regarding geographic conditions, Nepal 
does not possess a Navy because it is a landlocked state. Regarding economics, 
Liechtenstein—a state in Central Europe that faces security concerns due to its 
relationship with Switzerland—abolished its Army due to financial problems. 38 
Regarding domestic politics, India’s politicians and scientists play an important role in 
decisions about proliferation. To clarify, security needs, geographic conditions, economic 
support, and domestic politics are decisive variables for a state to establish or change a 
military. 
This thesis applies Sagan’s “Three Models” of proliferation theory to explain 
India’s overall expansion of its military power. 39  Sagan’s main thesis is that three 
motivating factors—security, norms, and domestic politics—explain a state’s nuclear 
expansion.40 Sagan claims that these three models are three different explanations for 
why states want or do not want to own nuclear weapons.41 His security model hold that a 
state’s strong military is driven by security concerns and survival, and it is along the same 
lines as neorealist thinking, which views the real world as anarchic. Therefore, Sagan 
argues that a state will develop nuclear bombs because doing so makes it strong. Strong 
states are able to do what they want, so strength is desirable. Additionally, the norms 
model holds that military expansion serves as an important emblem of a great state that a 
                                                 
37 Scott Peterson, “How Much is a Nuclear Program Worth? For Iran, Well Over $100 Billion,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0403/How-
much-is-a-nuclear-program-worth-For-Iran-well-over-100-billion.  
38 Walter S. G. Kohn, “The Sovereignty of Liechtenstein,” The American Journal of International Law 
61, no. 2 (1967): 547, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2197053. 
39 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” 54–86. 
40 Ibid., 54. 
41 Ibid., 55. 
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powerful country will pursue and prioritize. Sagan’s norms model claims that a state is 
motivated to have nuclear weapons because these weapons can enhance its international 
status not because of security concerns or domestic factors. The domestic-politics model 
holds that a state pursues military expansion due to its bureaucratic politics and parochial 
interests. This thesis uses two case studies to test the three models and see which of them 
has the most explanatory power.  
Sagan concludes that a state’s nuclear decision was multi-causality.42 In other 
words, a state’s decision is a combination of all three models, which means that no single 
model can perfectly explain a state’s decision, though all explanatory models are 
supportive. The answer for states’ nuclear proliferation varies because it depends on 
different states’ unique situations with other countries. Sagan argues that a state needs to 
consider all different consequences of a nuclear program for providing robust deterrence, 
protecting national security, enhancing national identity, and fulfilling domestic interests. 
Additionally, Sagan claims that policy makers can find contradictions among these three 
different models.43 Sagan uses the United States, a country with nuclear capability, as an 
example to demonstrate contradiction between the models. States following a security-
oriented strategy would restrain from proliferation, while a norms-oriented state would do 
the opposite. 44  According to Sagan’s conclusion, therefore, no model is superior to 
another. In short, all three models should be equal. 
A. THE SECURITY MODEL 
In the security model, security is the primary motivator for a state to expand its 
military power; this motivation suggests that military expansion is viewed as a guarantee 
of national security. Security motivates a state to expand its military capability because a 
state’s economic growth and survivability in the anarchic global system depend on basic 
security. Realistically, no powerful organization, state, or regime in the world could 
really force any other state to do anything. According to the neorealist theory of 
                                                 
42 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” 54. 
43 Ibid., 86. 
44 Ibid. 
 19 
international relations, conflict and war are inevitable because existing global 
organizations like the United Nations (UN) do not have the ability to enforce policing 
within the international system. Additionally, Edward Hallett Carr says that “in 
international politics, there is no organized power charged with the task of creating 
harmony.” 45  Therefore, Kenneth N. Waltz believes that “self-help is necessarily the 
principle of action in an anarchic order.”46 The whole world is anarchy. Therefore, a state 
has to rely on self-help to expand it military power and to protect its national security. 
For example, in the Indian security perspective, China was a potential threat and 
motivated India to ruminate over the question of nuclear selection. Sagan says that one of 
the main purposes of India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) in 1974 was to deter 
China; another purpose of this ambiguous nuclear standpoint was to avoid provoking 
another potential threat—Pakistan—for pursuing nuclear bombs as well.47 India’s fear of 
China is understandable, because from the time that India’s confrontation began with 
China in 1962, it only took two years for China to develop a nuclear bomb in 1964. 
India’s development of aircraft carriers is another security example. India 
discovered that aircraft carriers were critical because the INS Vikrant played a significant 
role in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. Parallel with Sagan’s security perspective, 
Bhaskar says that India needs aircraft carriers because India needs “energy security” in 
this era of “violent peace.”48 He argues that with the increasing importance of Persian 
Gulf oil, the maritime focus of global strategy has changed from a competitive military 
security in the Atlantic to a “free-trade and global economic inter-dependence” in the 
Pacific-Indian Ocean.49 India needs aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean to secure its 
energy supply and promote foreign trade. 
                                                 
45Edward Hallett Carr, “Realism and Idealism,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes 
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Aviation: Light and Medium Aircraft Carriers into the Twenty First Century, ed. Peter Hore and Thomas J. 
Hirschfeld (Hull, England: Eniversity of Hull Press, 1999), 39. 
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Under the ultimate goal of a state—survival—no state will tell anyone the real 
reasons for their behaviors. Because there is no way to be sure of the real intentions of 
other states, fear and self-help encourage power maximization and military expansion. 
The assumption of offensive realism is that a state will never learn how to self-control, 
and the best way to survive is to prevent other states from gaining relative power and 
advantages. Additionally, Morgenthau claims that a state’s behavior was a result of the 
will to power.50 In addition, states have the will to power because states want security. 
Hobbes stated that “man cannot assure the power and means to live well which he hath 
present, without the acquisition of more.”51 Then, Carr says that “territorial ambitions are 
just as likely to be the product as the cause of war.”52 A good example of this is the 1962 
Sino-Indian War that was caused by a territorial dispute between China and India.  
Offensive realists say that a state has the will to seek regional hegemony and to 
survive. Mearsheimer provides five assumptions of why great states pursue power. First, 
the world is anarchic, so security competition and conflict are unavoidable. Second, great 
states seek to own offensive military capability to destroy each other. Third, states can 
never be sure that another state will not attack using this offensive military power. Fourth, 
great powers’ terminal goal is survival. Finally, great states are rational actors that 
understand the need to use strategy and behavior for survival.53 
Furthermore, Mearsheimer thinks that security is never enough for a state; what a 
state really wants is power maximization. Furthermore, he suggests that great powers will 
focus on reaching four basic goals. First, great powers seek regional hegemony. Second, 
maximizing the world’s wealth under their control is a great power’s economic goal. 
Third, great powers establish strong air and naval forces to support robust armies in order 
to maximize their share of military power. Fourth, great powers’ ambition is superior to 
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their potential threats.54 So, a state believes that the best way to survive and to prevent 
starting a war is by becoming stronger and being the biggest.  
Expanding or maintaining a military is expensive for any state. Rich states can 
expand their military capabilities based on what they need for basic security without any 
foreign support. However, weak or poor states have two policies of military defense. 
They can either buy affordable or used weapons from other states to maintain basic 
security, or procure free weapons with a foreign state’s support. Pakistan, for example, 
gains military equipment and nuclear weapons support from China. Additionally, 
Pakistan has spent over 90 percent of U.S. military aid since September 11, 2001, on 
aircraft and advanced weapon systems intended to fight India. Another policy for a weak 
state is to ally with a stronger power to receive security. For example, the Philippines’ 
foreign and defense policies are closely related to those of the United States. The 
Philippines’ internal and external security greatly relies on security agreements with the 
United States.55 Iceland is another example that has a small population and no standing 
armed forces, but a lightly-armed Coast Guard is in charge of its defenses. Iceland is a 
member of NATO, and Iceland’s security heavily relies on the United States. If the 
security model is the main reason that a state expands its military capability, then the case 
studies should illustrate that security concerns caused a state to take actions against 
potential threats. 
B. THE NORMS MODEL 
The norms model suggests that a state wants to expand its military power because 
it would like to catch up with the standards of the great military powers. That is to say, 
states will pursue or expand certain weapons because that expansion symbolizes great 
power. In the norms model, symbolic function is the main driver of nuclear proliferation. 
For example, France established nuclear arsenals primarily based on the symbols of 
grandeur and independence, instead of on security concerns.56 France does not have an 
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obvious national security threat; therefore, the norms model is a strong explanation for 
France to maintain nuclear arsenals. As McGeorge Bundy states, the nuclear bombs were 
“[de Gaulle’s] passport to international grandeur. It would place France back where she 
belonged, among the Great Powers.”57 Bundy argues that prestige is the primary reason 
why France wants to keep nuclear weapons. If Bundy is correct, then states will attempt 
to expand their military capability even when security and domestic-politics are not 
motivating factors. 
Additionally, in “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” Sagan uses flags, 
airlines, and Olympic teams as examples to demonstrate how strong, legitimate, and 
modern states normally enhance their international prestige. 58  These symbols 
demonstrate how a great state can increase prestige by expanding different kinds of 
power. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John J. Mearsheimer says that “power is 
‘the currency’ of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What 
money is to economics, power is to international relations.”59 In essence, some states’ 
policymakers believe that certain equipment or weapons are needed to define their role in 
the world. With respect to the norms perspective, Bhaskar believes that carriers can be a 
symbol of a powerful state to enhance national prestige and identity.60 That is to say, 
India can uproot the image of a weak, postcolonial state by possessing aircraft carriers. 
Therefore, some states see military expansion as necessary to meet their national 
destinies. Although military expansion is expensive, policymakers believe it can “both 
shap[e] and reflect … a state’s identity.”61 For example, space exploration programs and 
military satellite launches are not affordable for most small and poor states, nor are they 
of security concern. However, space programs and military satellites are markers of states 
that exhibit advanced technologies. 
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C. THE DOMESTIC-POLITICS MODEL 
The domestic-politics model differs from the security and norms model. The 
domestic-politics model suggests that domestic factors primarily motivate or demotivate 
a state to expand its military capability. That is to say, this model suggests that 
bureaucratic or political interests within the state encourage or discourage its military 
expansion. According to Sagan’s domestic-politics model, domestic factors include the 
state’s military-related industries or laboratories, the armed forces, and politicians.62 A 
state is likely to expand its military capability when individuals from all three sectors 
share the same viewpoints and work together throughout the process of decision-making. 
For example, Sagan argues that the domestic-politics model is a persuasive 
explanation for India’s nuclear expansion because of three aspects. First, Prime Minister 
Gandhi made the decision for the PNE in a small group that only included few advisers 
and scientists instead of defense and foreign officials. Second, New Delhi made its 
decision in a rush without making long-term security considerations. Third, Prime 
Minister Gandhli understood that she could use a PNE to increase her low domestic 
support in early 1974. Although the domestic politics model provides powerful evidence 
than the security model, the domestic politics model alone is inadequate to correctly 
explain India’s nuclear case. 
The domestic-politics model is founded upon the bottom-up logic that industrial-
scientific-military factors motivate politicians or policymakers to make a decision 
regarding military expansion.63 Once domestic industries have the capability to establish 
military-related weapons or platforms, and once state-run laboratories have the 
techniques to develop advanced weapons, entrepreneurs and scientists will encourage 
governments to take action to increase the flow of income and prestige in these industries 
and laboratories. Additionally, each service branch of the military possesses its own 
specific responsibilities, and these responsibilities or roles will generate bureaucratic 
interests that are partial to particular weapons. Besides, politicians could use military 
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expansion to increase job opportunities and thus enhance the morale of the public, 
leading to increase popular support. If the domestic-politics model is the most significant, 
then domestic actors should support military expansion even if there is a negative effect 
on the future of both security and norms. In other words, the security and norms models 
would not motivate a state’s military expansion without domestic support. 
 25 
III. INDIA’S MILITARY EXPANSION—CASE STUDIES 
This thesis uses India’s two case studies—nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers—
to determine which model of military expansion theory best explains India’s continued 
expansion. According to the GFP’s report, India is the fourth-largest military power in the 
world and is still expanding its military power at a fast pace.64 On the one hand, India 
might want use its ambition to stay ahead of China, indeed to provide national security to 
its citizens. According to the neo-realist viewpoint, states believe that being the biggest 
power is the key to survival. On the other hand, policymakers of India might just want to 
use military expansion to enhance national prestige or to earn more public support. 
India’s economic growth has slowed since 2010, but the growth of its military spending 
and military weapon importation never slowed.65 In fact, as shown in Table 2, India’s 
defense budget increases year by year. The continuing growth of India’s defense budget 
will attract other states’ attention, especially when there is a high growth rate in select 
budget years. For example, according to the India Strategic Report, India’s defense 
budget increased 17.92 percent in 2004–2005, 10 percent in 2008–2009, 34.19 percent in 
2009–2010, 11.59 percent in 2011–2012, 17.63 percent in 2012–2013, and 10 percent in 
2014–2015.66 The budget was expanded for military modernization and paid for huge 
personnel costs. In addition, India has been the biggest military weapons importer in the 
world since 2010.67 India is not only the largest but also, purchases twice the weapons as 
the second and third biggest buyers—China and Pakistan. 
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Table 2.   Military Expenditure among India, Pakistan, and China, 1990–
201268  
Year/State India Pakistan China 






1990 188(3.2) 58.6(5.8) [49] (2.5) 
1991 199(3.0) 70.2(5.8) [53.3] (2.4) 
1992  213(2.8) 81.6(6.1) [68.9] (2.5) 



















































































                                                 
68“Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Project, accessed August 
25, 2014, http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/expenditures/country-search. [] = SIPRI estimate; () = 
share of GDP. 
 27 
A. NUCLEAR EXPANSION 
This section focuses on India’s nuclear development from the partition to the 
present. Table 3 demonstrates that India, China, and Pakistan continue to expand their 
nuclear arsenals. This thesis uses three military expansion models to analyze India’s 
nuclear case to determine which model is the most powerful explanation. 
1. Security Model 
India’s nuclear weapon expansion is based on the security model because of its 
historical conflicts and nuclear weapons neighbors—China and Pakistan. This section is 
broken into two portions to explain India’s case. The first summarizes India’s three 
periods of nuclear development since the partition of 1947 demonstrated that India’s 
expansion has been motivated by security concerns. Secondly, this section ends by 
examining how China and Pakistan’s three nuclear behaviors influence India’s. 
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, India’s nuclear weapons development process since 
partition can be divided into three periods: none (before 1989), opaque (1990–1998), and 
overt (after 1999). The first period of India’s nuclear development was primarily 
motivated by China’s security threats. India’s early days of founding through 1989 
illustrate the precursors that led to its nuclear expansion. China seems to be the biggest 
security concern for India because all of its geopolitical variables—economy, population, 
territory, and length of coastline—are more advanced than India’s. Moreover, since the 
Sino-Indian War of 1962, India has known that China is another big security challenge. 
After the war, India has expanded its military to keep pace with China. In 1964, 
immediately following the Sino-Indian War, China began to develop nuclear weapons 
and to test nuclear bombs.69 The timing of China’s nuclear weapons testing was sensitive; 
the country wanted to enhance its deterrence and to target India. After nearly a decade, 
India began testing its nuclear weapons and refused to sign the NPT. 
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Table 3.   Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1964–201470  
Year India Pakistan China 
1964    1 
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Table 4.   The Conflicts between India and Pakistan71  
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No Militarized action 
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Use of force 
Display of force 
Use of force 
Use of force 
Use of force 
Use of force 
Use of force 
Display of force 
Display of force 
No Militarized action 
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Use of force 
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Use of force 
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Use of force 
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Use of force 
Use of force 
Use of force 
War 
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Use of force 
No Militarized action 
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No Militarized action 
No Militarized action 
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No Militarized action 
No Militarized action 
Display of force 
No Militarized action 
Display of force 
No Militarized action 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability  
No nuclear capability  
No nuclear capability  
No nuclear capability  
No nuclear capability  
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability  
No nuclear capability  
No nuclear capability 
No nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
De facto nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
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Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
Overt nuclear capability 
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Along the same line, in Dangerous Deterrent, S. Paul Kapur states that a series of 
security issues led India to change its nuclear policy due to its fear and desire for survival. 
Although India has refused to join the nuclear non-proliferation community since 1970, 
India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had previously publicly rejected the 
development of nuclear weapons.72 Historical events demonstrate why India started to 
rethink its anti-nuclear policy. For example, India lost the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and 
China tested its nuclear weapons in 1964. Therefore, India began to reconsider its need 
for a nuclear program and refused to sign the NPT in order to deter a growing China. 
Accordingly, historical events suggest that security drove India’s initial period of nuclear 
weapons possession. 
The vicious circle of nuclear proliferation in South Asia pushed India forward in 
its nuclear decision. China’s nuclear expansion motivated India’s nuclear program, and 
then India’s expansion of military capabilities motivated Pakistan’s nuclear development. 
After Pakistan lost the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
collected renowned atomic scientists in Multan to ask them to develop nuclear bombs in 
January 1972. Bhutto seriously reported that “we are fighting a thousand year war with 
India, and we will make an atomic bomb even if we have to eat grass.”73 This period of 
India’s nuclear development started with its decision to build the Bhabha Atomic 
Research Center (BARC). At 8:05 a.m. on May 18, 1974, India successfully conducted 
its first nuclear device demonstration, and India called this explosion the “Smiling 
Buddha” or “peaceful” nuclear explosion.74 India used the 1974 explosion to prove its 
nuclear capability and ambiguous nuclear posture. However, the so-called “peaceful” 
nuclear explosions were not peaceful for other states around the world.  
The Brasstacks Crisis of 1986 was a turning point between the first and second 
periods of nuclear development. This crisis sped up the process of India’s nuclear 
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expansion due to the high degree of hostility and corresponding sense of insecurity. 
India’s second period of development, which is referred to here as an opaque period, 
began once India’s nuclear capability was fully matured but not confirmed by testing. On 
one side, India’s policy makers thought that they did not have to warn Pakistan before 
conducting Operation Brasstacks at the Indo-Pakistani border area because it was a 
routine exercise. On the other side, Pakistan’s leaders saw this exercise as showing off 
India’s conventional superiority and taking the opportunity to invade Pakistani territory, 
and then Pakistan held an “offensive and provocative” reaction in response.75 India’s 
officials analyzed the Brasstacks Crisis and believed that “Pakistan would never cease its 
hostility towards India as this emanated from the inner logic of its very existence; thus, 
Pakistan’s anti-India policies were not temporary or tactical.” 76  Most importantly, 
Pakistan became a de facto nuclear weapon state after the Brasstacks Crisis, and India 
was rethinking the significance of the nuclear war-fight capabilities.77 Accordingly, the 
Brasstacks Crisis has greatly contributed to both India and Pakistan’s decision to 
assemble atomic bombs because of security concerns.  
India’s third period of nuclear development—overt nuclear expansion—was and 
is still motivated by its security threats, especially China, and its nuclear test in 1998 
proved that its nuclear capability was fully developed. With the end of the Cold War in 
1991, the security umbrella provided by the former Soviet Union was no longer available 
to protect India. In other words, India lost one strong ally to confront the threat of China 
because the security agreements of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971 were not relevant once 
the Soviet Union had collapsed.78 Thus, fear of the growing Chinese military capabilities 
quickened India’s pace of developing nuclear capabilities and motivated the nuclear test 
of 1998. For example, Pravin Sawhney in his article cites Defense Minister George 
Fernandes’ report, which distinguishes “China as [India’s] potential threat Number 
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One.”79 Furthermore, the Prime Minister of India, A. B. Vajpayee, sent a letter to the 
president of the United States, Bill Clinton, and explained “China is the main reason for 
conducting nuclear test.” 80  In other words, India’s fear of China’s nuclear power 
motivated India to develop nuclear bombs. To make matters worse, Pakistan 
subsequently sped up its weapon program through China’s support. Today, India’s 
current number of nuclear warheads—around 90 to 110—is close to the number of 
Pakistan’s. 81  Nevertheless, India’s nuclear development has been gradual and has 
followed China’s and Pakistan’s pace. For a poor country like Pakistan, the nuclear 
warhead has been a relatively affordable weapon. As Sagan says, the nuclear weapon 
provides “robust and affordable security.”82 India does manufacture similar quantities of 
nuclear weapons to keep pace with Pakistan. 
India can use nuclear expansion to deter China and Pakistan from launching full-
scale nuclear war and punish any malicious adversaries that use nuclear weapons first. 
That is to say, India’s nuclear weapon expansion is based on the security concern that is a 
result of China’s and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. The nuclear weapons behaviors of 
Pakistan and China instigate India’s fear and influence its nuclear expansion in three 
ways.  
First, because China and Pakistan have not reduced their nuclear arsenals, India 
has followed suit. 83 According to Table 3, Nuclear Weapons Inventories 1964–2014, 
China has possessed nuclear weapons since 1964, and China’s nuclear arsenals reached 
its first peak in 1984. Since then, China had showed a small trend of disarmament of 
nuclear weapons since its number (249) of nuclear weapons reached its highest point in 
1984. However, when India overtly owned nuclear capability, China has reversed its 
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trend from a decrease to an increase of its nuclear arsenals since 2000—just one year 
after both India and Pakistan possessed overt nuclear capability. At the same time, India 
also rapidly increased its nuclear warheads from 14 to 110, which is nearly a 700 percent 
expansion.84 Simultaneously, Pakistan has speedily increased its nuclear warheads from 
13 to 120, which is in excess of an 800 percent expansion.85 Therefore, India uses 
nuclear expansion to address its insecurity from its geographic location. India is 
sandwiched between two adversaries—China and Pakistan—that own nuclear warheads, 
and these states have experienced numerous conflicts. On one side, China remains 
reluctant to share how many nuclear warheads it actually owns. On the other side, 
Pakistan wants to produce more nuclear warheads than India and receives assistance in 
nuclear manufacturing from China. 
Second, since Pakistan was unwilling to sign the NPT, India pulled out of the 
NPT. Initially, India had been advocating for an anti-nuclear policy. India’s anti-nuclear 
and pro-nuclear supporters had been debating this issue for more than 20 years. However, 
India has excluded itself from membership of the NPT. Indian officials claim that 
conventional superiority will not defeat a nuclear-strong Pakistan within a world that 
requires self-help to survive. 
Third, Pakistan’s policy of nuclear weapons usage has forced India to expand its 
nuclear weapons as well. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi still holds a no-first-use 
nuclear weapons doctrine. 86  However, Pakistan does not have the same policy. 
Essentially, India and most states know that nuclear weapons will cause chaos and 
disaster. India will probably not be the first to use a nuclear weapon to threaten or launch 
a war based on its no-first-use policy, but India needs nuclear expansion to provide 
deterrence and to protect its national security. Pakistan does hold a first-use doctrine, so it 
would strike India with nuclear bombs. Therefore, India requires nuclear weapons and 
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robust second-strike capabilities to retaliate against a Pakistan that has such a nuclear 
policy. 
Regarding second-strike capabilities, India continues to increase the quantity and 
quality of ballistic missiles to enhance its deterrence. India’s deadliest ballistic missile, 
the Agni-5, can provide a powerful deterrent for India’s national security. India first 
tested its two-stage Agni II intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on April 11, 
1999. The test showed that the Agni II has a range of 2,000 kilometers, which can reach 
any city in Pakistan. Obviously, the Agni II’s range is not far enough to reach the entire 
territory of the potential adversary—China. Therefore, India’s sense of insecurity 
motivates its further development of the ballistic missile. India has developed the Agni-5, 
a three-stage missile, designed to carry a 1-ton nuclear warhead with a 5,000-kilometer 
range capability. The test launch was successfully conducted on September 15, 2013.87 
Most importantly, this missile can be launched on multiple platforms, such as moving 
vehicles and submarines, to greatly enhance India’s second-strike capability to deter 
China’s rising and Pakistan’s first-use policy. 
2. Norms Model 
India’s nuclear program and its overt nuclear capabilities attracted the attention of 
the global community. Nuclear bombs made India become not just a great conventional 
state, but also a nuclear power. India’s nuclear capabilities earned the country national 
prestige and improved its international status—much like the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council did in the early days of their nuclear development. Additionally, 
India might have used nuclear development to fulfill a sense of technological triumph and 
to be identified as a powerful state. Therefore, several reasons explain why India is one of 
the civilian governments that has not signed the NPT. Just like many other states in the 
world, India believes it will become a great power in the near future. Accordingly, most 
of the policy-makers of India argue that nuclear weapons can greatly enhance 
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international prestige to allow India a stronger voice among other great states, such as 
China and the United States. 
India’s 1998 nuclear test bolstered its national confidence and uprooted the image 
of a weak state. Former Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit said this test “would increase 
Vajpayee’s credibility and infuse India with a great sense of confidence and pride.”88 In 
India’s Nuclear Bomb, George Perkovich points out that the image of a nuclear test 
declared for the Indian people that “colonialism was dead—again,” and he argues that 
“anticolonial motivation” is one of the drivers that presses India to conduct a nuclear 
program because nuclear capability symbolized India as a great state instead of weak 
state like most postcolonial states in the 1940s.89 Therefore, this kind of anti-colonialism 
pushes India further into its nuclear program.  
From the normative perspective, India also enhanced its prestige from its ballistic 
missiles and sea-launched nuclear capabilities. As India’s economy continued to grow, it 
wanted to follow the path of other great powers, as the norms model depicts. For 
example, regarding the intermediate-range ballistic missile, India did not only develop it 
due to security concerns but also due to normative reasons; it wanted to show its 
advanced technology and robust power. Similarly, in Why Countries Go for Ballistic 
Missiles, Upendra Chaudhary argues, “nuclear and missile programs are symbols of 
technical prowess and scientific competence by virtue of which India can be placed 
alongside the world’s leading developed nations.”90 That is to say, a state could become a 
great power by developing advanced and complicated ballistic missiles as a significant 
symbol. 
India’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles are its most powerful land-to-land 
weapons and can carry multiple nuclear warheads. The reason for this focus is because 
ballistic missiles and the civilian space-launch program are associated with each other 
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and are a symbol of national prestige and high-tech development. Techniques of ballistic 
missiles and civilian space-launches are interlinked. Moreover, these programs need 
advanced technology and sophisticated know-how for development. According to an 
Arms Control Association report, there are 31 states that have developed and currently 
own ballistic missiles around the world.91 Only India and six other states have ballistic 
missiles with a range of over 5,000 kilometers, meaning their bombs can reach any city in 
their region.92 The ballistic missile is a strategic and classified weapon that requires high-
level technology and considerable testing time. Therefore, the ballistic missile is a 
symbol of a powerful and technologically advanced state. 
3. Domestic-Politics Model 
The third model that reflects India’s decision to pursue a nuclear program centers 
on the pressures coming from domestic factors. These pressures are not external drivers 
like security concerns or symbols of great power in an anarchic world, which are the two 
models examined previously. Domestic factors are internal drivers that include defense 
and scientific organizations and political parties; these bureaucratic and parochial 
interests might also drive India’s nuclearization.  
Three primary complexes greatly contribute to India’s nuclear expansion: the 
atomic energy establishment, defense research and development organizations, and the 
space research program. 93  Itty Abraham calls these complexes “strategic enclaves” 
because the products they make are for strategic usage to achieve national security goals 
and because the facilities are “institutionally, spatially, and legally . . . distinct and 
different from the existing structure of the Indian military-security complex.”94 Indeed, 
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these complexes need “privileged political and budgetary support” from India’s 
policymakers to create those advanced nuclear arsenals. 95  Therefore, India’s 
nuclearization should consider these three strategic enclaves.  
Nuclear facilities with India’s best equipment and most talented scientists have 
enabled the establishment of atomic energy. For example, India’s 1974 explosion and the 
1998 nuclear test both occurred at the BARC in Bombay. Tellis argues that the 
establishment of atomic energy will continually drive India’s nuclearization in three 
aspects. First, it will motivate “nuclear research and development on weapon designs.”96 
Second, the establishment of atomic energy will encourage India to seek opportunities to 
conduct nuclear tests in the future. Third, it will persistently discourage India from 
assenting to follow the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).97 
 India’s defense research and development organizations, combined with its space 
research program, are the drivers that push India’s nuclear bomb to a higher level. These 
organizations include many different kinds of defense laboratories and institutions that 
can develop “the specific safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF) system”98 to make 
nuclear weapons more usable. Additionally, India’s space program includes the most 
advanced technology and know-how about the development of bomb delivery systems. 
Tellis asserts that these complexes will drive India to develop its nuclear program in three 
aspects. First, they will motivate India to produce a longer delivery system that is more 
difficult to intercept. Second, these complexes will continue to develop India’s second-
strike capabilities from different platforms such as aircraft, submarines, and mobile 
vehicles. Third, they will motivate India to modify its nuclear arsenals.99 Accordingly, 
the establishment of atomic energy, the defense research and development organizations, 
and the space research program are all bureaucratic factors that influence India’s decision 
to expand its nuclear capabilities.  
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Politics are a key factor that affects India’s nuclear weapons expansion. Generally, 
different political parties have different proclivities for specific military developments. 
However, India’s nuclear expansion has continued since the country initially developed 
nuclear weapons. India’s 1998 nuclear test provided the BJP-dominated government 
some domestic political benefits. Consequently, as one commentator from The Times of 
India claimed, “No government in India will go against the consensus in favor of creation 
of an adequate nuclear deterrent.”100 Policymakers understand that the public supports 
nuclear developments and that aligning with the public will enhance their popularity. 
Therefore, India’s leaders remain in agreement on this particular issue to maintain public 
support, despite the fact that the political party of the prime minister and leading party 
have alternated after every general election since 1977.101  
India’s domestic political environment is a persuasive explanation for India’s 
1974 nuclear explosion and its 1998 nuclear test for two primary reasons. First, the 
decision-making of these two events occurred in a small group within a short period of 
time. India’s nuclear weapons program was authorized by Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi on September 7, 1972. A small team consisting of 75 scientists worked on 
developing a nuclear bomb at the BARC. Moreover, India made the final decision on 
May 8, 1974, which is 10 days before the explosion.102 Similarly, in 1998, before India’s 
nuclear test, only “Vajpayee, Mishra, and Jaswant Singh participated in the relevant 
deliberations with the top scientists. Advani’s and Sinha’s role remain unclear. Fernandes 
was told only two days before the event, while the three military service chiefs and the 
foreign secretary were informed on May 10.”103 This small group of top decision makers 
hastily authorized the 1998 nuclear test within several days and without long-term 
strategic plans.104 The scientists were willing to push the nuclear program because they 
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needed to ensure that the government would continue to financially support their 
laboratories.  
Second, for many decades, members of different political parties have understood 
that they can use nuclear policy to enhance their reputation and public support. Gerard 
Braunthal, an American researcher, conducted a public survey in India during February–
March and May 1966, which was several months after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 
and four years after the Sino-Indian War of 1962. His reports note that, “Indeed, 7 out of 
10 believed India should produce her own atomic weapons.” 105 Regarding the 1974 
explosion, Prime Minister Gandhli used the PNE to increase her low domestic support 
and to assist with elections. Indeed, in June 1974, Indian public opinion polls 
demonstrated that 90 percent of the Indian population viewed this explosion as a great 
achievement.106 Again, in 1998, BJP used nuclear policy as the theme of their campaign 
manifesto, ambiguously stating that they would “re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy 
and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.”107 The BJP’s subsequent public 
support proved that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s decision was right. Six major cities’ 
public opinion polls showed that 91 percent of the population approved the 1998 nuclear 
test.108 In fact, after hearing news of the nuclear test, the Indian people walked to the 
streets to celebrate. 
4. Conclusion  
Although no one single model can fully explain India’s nuclear expansion, the 
evidence in this thesis suggests that the security model is the stronger motivation for 
India to possess a bomb. India cannot abandon nuclear bombs because of two security 
threats: Pakistan and China. First, India needs second-strike capabilities to retaliate 
against Pakistan’s use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has not only increased the number of 
its bombs, but it also has developed more advanced nuclear warheads. Clearly, Pakistan’s 
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nuclear bombs are aimed to deter India, and its first-use policy contributes to India’s 
nuclear expansion. Second, and the most significant perspective, China primarily drives 
India’s nuclear weapons program. India needs to expand nuclear capabilities to deter 
rising China because China’s military power and numerous nuclear tests frighten India. 
Undoubtedly, India’s security needs have prompted the country toward nuclear 
expansion. India’s leaders believe that nuclear weapons can protect national security and 
rival the threats from China and Pakistan. All three phases of India’s nuclear 
development—none, opaque, and overt—began with security concerns. During the first 
phase, India’s fear of a growing nuclear power, China, motivated its nuclear program. In 
the second phase, consequences of the Brasstacks Crisis in 1986 significantly influenced 
India’s nuclear status. Finally, the third phase of India’s development can be viewed as an 
attempt to make every effort to provide national security instead of relying on other super 
powers, such as the United States or the Soviet Union. Additionally, China and Pakistan’s 
nuclear behaviors—expansion of nuclear arsenals, unwillingness to sign the NPT, and the 
first-use policy—motivated India’s nuclear expansion. In other words, India’s sense of 
insecurity stemmed from two things: its adversaries’ nuclear expansion and Pakistan’s 
use of nuclear capabilities as a shield to boldly perform its anti-India policy. India, China, 
and Pakistan are the only three nuclear holders that are not reducing their arsenals.109 
According to the SIPRI report, most nuclear weapons states are declining their 
inventories due to the fact that these weapons have the potential to cause mass destruction.  
As is the case in most nuclear states, the security model provides a powerful 
explanation for India’s expansion. However, the equation is not complete without the 
norms and domestic-politics models. In terms of the norms model, nuclear bombs and 
ballistic missiles are symbols of a powerful and technologically advanced state. Anti-
colonialism pushed India further into its nuclear program and ballistic missiles, and these 
nuclear expansions bolstered its national confidence and uprooted the image of a weak 
state. Regarding domestic-politics, “Strategic enclaves” are composed of the atomic 
energy establishment, defense research and development organizations, and the space 
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research program that greatly contribute to India’s nuclear expansion. Political parties’ 
decision-making and public support are additional domestic-politics factors for India’s 
nuclear weapons expansion. Accordingly, the security, the norms, and the domestic-
politics models should be combined to provide the best explanation for India’s nuclear 
expansion.    
However, norms and domestic-politics models cannot completely explain India’s 
case. The norms model is unable to clarify why India’s previous policymakers did not 
assemble nuclear bombs as soon as possible, as opposed to waiting until 1998. The 
timing of India’s overt nuclear development does not fully support the norms model. If 
India’s policymakers sought to pursue nuclear bombs for the sake of prestige, India could 
have developed atomic bombs after its first nuclear explosion of 1974 instead of waiting 
until after the end of the Cold War. Prime Minister Nehru publicly rejected nuclear 
bombs before, but he would not say if he believed in the norms model. Domestically, the 
issue of nuclear bombs would not sustain itself politically without external continued 
security concerns for India. Empirically, India already had domestic supports—nuclear 
technology—in hand since its first nuclear explosion; India’s only question was when and 
whether to go forth with these weapons. 
B. SEA POWER EXPANSION—AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 
This section focuses on India’s naval development and then uses the example of 
aircraft carriers to determine which model of military expansion theory best explains 
India’s case. The Indian Navy’s 2003 slogan, Taking to the Blue Waters, fully 
demonstrates its willingness to expand maritime capabilities.110 This thesis employs three 
models—the security, norms, and domestic-politics models—to analyze why a state 
expands its sea power. Table 5 demonstrates that the Indian Navy is expanding in quality 
more than size in its three main types of naval platforms—surface combatants (aircraft 
carriers, destroyers, and frigates), submarines, and amphibious ships. Examining the 
number of ships, total displacement, and the number of missile cells demonstrates that 
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India is exchanging timeworn platforms for newfangled ones and upgrading its weapons’ 
performance instead of sharply increasing the number of ships. The Navy is increasing 
the number of its ships, but it is more focused on elevating their quality. 
Table 5.   Qualitative Measures: Displacement and Missile Complement of 
Major Naval Platforms111  
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Regarding military expansion, increased military capability is two-dimensional, 
centering on both quantity and quality. India’s military expansion not only increases the 
number of missiles, equipment, and personnel but also upgrades military weapons and 
equipment by replacing old ones. India’s military modernization not only increases the 
quantity of the weapons dramatically, but also raises its military power to a higher level. 
India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier is an example; India eliminated an old weapon and 
purchased or manufactured a high-performance weapon to replace the old one, thus 
expanding quality. 
 
1. Security Model 
The security model is one of the most appropriate explanations for India’s sea 
power expansion for two primary reasons: robust deterrence and sea control. First, the 
Indian Navy needs powerful deterrence to prevent a hostile state from harming its 
interests. The Indian Navy could use its robust sea power to discourage neighbors that 
seek to undermine its interests and use its nuclear second strike capabilities as a threat of 
punishment. Second, India relies on sea control to protect its own SLOC; sea control is a 
vital part of maritime strategy that secures trade and resources. 
a. Deterrence  
India and China are two great sea powers that have their own vast strategic needs 
and maritime interests around Asia. Aircraft carriers are the Indian Navy’s best 
conventional weapon to deter an unfriendly power—specifically China. John F. Lehman 
suggests that “deterrence and war-fighting” are two of the main purposes of the aircraft 
carriers. 112  Similarly, Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr. (Ret.) also claims that “crisis 
management and deterrence of full-scale war” are an aircraft carrier’s main mission.113 
Aircraft carriers can do so because they are good approaches to deploy armed forces to 
any area on earth. As Robert Jervis’s deterrence model states, “great dangers arise if an 
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aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve.”114 That 
is to say, a state should better be able to display its strong military capabilities to deter a 
potential threat’s aggressive behaviors. According to research from the RAND 
Corporation, “the Indian Navy hopes to possess three V/STOL carriers . . . , precipitated 
by Indian fears of regional conflicts spilling over into its security sphere . . . The Chinese 
presence on the Indian Ocean, which Indian policy-makers now trumpet as an inevitable 
but troublesome possibility.”115 In the same vein, the Journal of Military and Strategic 
Studies by David Scott claims that India is constructing a “blue water” navy against 
another emerging “blue water” navy—China.116 China is building its second and first 
indigenous aircraft carrier, and some experts note that the “People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) needs a total of four carriers by 2020.”117 On the other hand, India is not 
only constructing its third aircraft carrier but is planning to design another indigenous 
super carrier, the Vishal, which is scheduled to be commissioned by 2025.118 India and 
China will be two robust sea powers that might go head-to-head over the Indian Ocean in 
the next 10 to 15 years. Essentially, a rising China is India’s security concern due to its 
geostrategic significance and economic interests. 
First, the Indian Ocean’s strategic location is crucial for China to dominate the 
region. Scott analyzed that “China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy across the Indian Ocean 
[has been] causing concern for Indian strategists.”119 Clearly, to become an economic and 
military hegemon, China needs to not only focus on the Pacific Ocean, but also the Indian 
Ocean. India is concerned about this focus because India has experienced border disputes 
and wars with China since 1947. Additionally, China has initiated many conflicts and 
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crises in Asia, such as those in the South China Sea. Accordingly, India’s fear of China 
contributes to its sea power expansion.  
Second, China is India’s security concern because China seeks to control the sea 
lines of communication around the Indian Ocean to secure its economic interests. 
According to China’s “Sea Power Nation” Strategy by Wu Xiaoyan, “nearly 60 percent 
of China’s imported crude oil arrives through the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait 
into the South China Sea.”120 Similarly, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara believe 
that China turns to the Indian Ocean to protect its trade and raw materials. 121  For 
example, China has frequently dispatched the People’s Liberation Army Navy ships to 
the Gulf of Aden to support anti-piracy operations and to protect its shipping since its 
economic growth globally.122 In essence, China might wield its influence around the 
Indian Ocean to safeguard its own interests, thus threatening India’s security and 
motivating India to expand its Navy as a deterrence tactic. That is to say, if China’s 
economic interests include securing freedom in the Indian Ocean, these interests directly 
conflict with those of India. Summing up, China’s westward gaze threatens India’s 
security and motivates India to expand its Navy by building aircraft carriers to deter 
China. 
The race to build aircraft carriers is a major contest between India and China. 
According to neo-realist thinking, a state will continually keep growing to maximize 
relative power under an anarchic system. Therefore, every state would like to have a large 
and strong Navy if they can. Today, India still only has two active aircraft carriers on 
hand; more importantly, following the decommissioning of the INS Vikrant, India only 
possessed one aircraft carrier from 1997 to 2013. India needs two aircraft carriers to 
rotate the duties of its missions. One carrier can do regular maintenance or repair while 
another can sail on the Indian Ocean to perform its mission. The arms race of aircraft 
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carriers between India and China seems to have begun in 2013 when China’s first carrier, 
Liaoning, completed its testing and training. Coincidentally, India commissioned its 
aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, the same year and capitalized on its indigenous carrier 
to reply to China’s Russian purchased Liaoning. Accordingly, India has a clear intention 
of using aircraft carriers to deter China.  
Aircraft carriers allow India to enforce sea denial, and nuclear submarines are a 
powerful punishment to persuade adversaries not to impede India’s interests. Walter C. 
Ladwig III states that sea denial is “negating an enemy’s ability to use the sea but at the 
same time making no attempt to control the sea itself.”123 Indian aircraft carriers with 
combat surface ships can combine air and sea power to prevail over the “Air-Sea 
Battle.”124 Geoffrey Till use the Air-Sea Battle as a concept that “aims to deter, defeat 
and disrupt anti-access and and/or area-denial capabilities.”125 This concept is in the 
same vein as Zumwalt’s belief that aircraft carriers are influential tools of crisis 
management that deter a full-scale war. The nuclear second strike capability of India’s 
submarines provides another form of deterrence—one that encourages states to consider 
the catastrophic costs of undermining Indian’s interests. 
b. Sea Control  
Sea control is one of the most significant missions that the Indian Navy uses to 
protect the security of its SLOC. Till defines sea control as that which “denote[s] a navy’s 
capacity to use an area of sea for its own purposes for as long as necessary to achieve 
those purposes and to deny that ability to others.” 126 Additionally, George W. Baer 
believes that “the first job of the fast-carrier task forces was sea control.”127 The Indian 
Navy knows sea control is vital and losing sea control is very dangerous because India 
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cannot afford to lose control of sea lanes. The India Maritime Doctrine 2009 
demonstrates that its maritime strategy is based on “the freedom to use the seas for our 
national purpose, under all circumstances.”128 That is to say, the Indian Navy will do 
whatever is best to control the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the India Maritime Doctrine 
2009 concludes that “sea control is the central concept around which the Indian Navy is 
structured.”129 Aircraft carriers are ideal weapons systems that can “wage war far away 
from their mainland.”130 India can use aircraft carriers to deploy its military power far 
away based on their function. Indian officials claimed that, “We aim to exercise selective 
sea control in the waters of the Indian Ocean by deploying task forces built around the 
core of aircraft carriers.” 131  India could use aircraft carriers to project its power to 
undertake long-range operations against potential threats from the entire Indian Ocean to 
the western Pacific Ocean. Accordingly, Indian policy-makers may continually expand 
naval power to compete against rising hostile neighbors and secure sea control. 
Sea lines of control are the lifeline of India’s economy because the country’s trade 
and crude oil are heavily dependent on seaborne shipping. About 90 percent of India’s 
goods are traded through the Indian Ocean.132 Additionally, about 70 percent of India’s 
oil and more than 50 percent of its natural gas are received from Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Kuwait, and Iraq.133 Thus, India’s energy mainly comes from the Persian Gulf, which 
leaders view as “a primary national maritime interest.”134 No wonder India asserts that 
“maritime security for supply lines and installations will remain a primary responsibility 
of the Indian Navy.” 135  Furthermore, India’s maritime strategy explicitly notes that 
“whatever happens in the [Indian Ocean littoral region] can affect our national security 
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and is of interest to us.”136 Accordingly, maintaining sea control to protect India’s trade 
and oil to sustaining its economic growth is driving the expansion of its sea power. 
2. Norms Model 
The norms model is another Indian driver for maritime expansion because the 
aircraft carrier symbolizes sea power. Furthermore, great sea power projects the image of 
a superior state. An emerging state like China can sharply enhance national prestige or 
the identity of a great power by possessing its first aircraft carrier no matter how a state 
gets it: self-built or purchased. India has owned and operated its first aircraft carrier, the 
INS Vikrant, since 1961, which was decommissioned in January 1997.137 India has been 
a regional power since the overwhelming victory of the Indo-Pakistan War in 1971. The 
INS Vikrant played an important role during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, and this war 
proved that India was a great conventional power in South Asia by demonstrating its 
robust sea, land, and air power since India was the first state to operate aircraft carriers in 
South Asia, including its competing neighbor, China.  
More importantly, after India’s acquisition of aircraft carriers in 1987 and 2013, 
which were the INS Viraat and INS Vikramaditya, India is building its first indigenous 
aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, to illustrate its advances in technology. INS Vikrant’s 
building shows India as one of the great powers that has the capability to design and 
manufacture giant aircraft carriers. INS Vikrant is expected to be commissioned by 2017, 
according to India’s Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral D. K. Joshi.138 That is to say, India 
could be comparable to the United States by obtaining two aircraft carriers, increasing 
from one to three, within four years. In addition, India and the United States will be the 
only two states that possess more than two aircraft carriers in the world. Once a state 
spends a considerable amount of time and budget to acquire expertise, a state will never 
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be dependent on any other state again. Therefore, India really enjoys an enhanced 
international reputation because of its first indigenous aircraft carrier.  
Besides, aircraft carriers are conducive to establish India’s national identity as a 
great state. In “The Indian Naval Carrier Experience,” C. Uday Bhaskar asserts that 
India’s persuasiveness for building aircraft carriers can uproot the image of a postcolonial 
weak state.139 In a comparison of an aircraft carrier’s purpose and function, it is an 
effective way to exhibit a state’s influences around the world. India could have used 
aircraft carriers as a tool for long range maritime diplomacy when the Indian Navy had 
shown its national flag far in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Even more, India is taking 
advantage of its blue water Navy to become a regional power and to apply for a 
permanent UN Security Council seat.140 The aircraft carrier is a platform that represents 
an extension of a state’s territory and superior sea-power, but it is too expensive for many 
states to afford. 
The pace of aircraft carrier acquisition shows India’s economy fully supports its 
goal to become a symbol of regional sea power. Regarding aircraft carriers’ high cost, 
they are the most expensive pieces of military equipment ever built in the world, so most 
states see carriers as an unaffordable option.141 For example, the cost of the CVN-78 
class aircraft carrier is at least approximately U.S. $9.8 billion, and the INS Vikrant will 
be more than U.S. $5 billion.142 The United States owns the most, the largest, and the 
best aircraft carriers in the world; besides the United States, Italy and India are the only 
states to own more than one aircraft carrier.143 Therefore, aircraft carriers symbolize 
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India not just as a great military power, but also an economic one. In terms of sea power 
expansion, both quantity and quality need to be measured. With regard to quantity, the 
full-load displacement and number of missile cells of a ship can roughly measure a ship’s 
capability without thoroughly analyzing its weapon, radar, and propulsion systems.144 
According to Table 5, India’s Navy has expanded its major naval platforms from 51 to 53 
(an increase of 4 percent) since 1991. Although the quality of ships is slowly increasing, 
the quantity is quickly expanding. The statistics illustrate that the aggregate displacement 
of the Indian Navy has approximately increased 68 percent since 1991, and the number of 
missile cells has increased more than six times since 1991. Furthermore, India’s 
upcoming aircraft carrier, its first indigenous carrier, demonstrates that India is 
committed to economic development and uses its economic growth to develop robust 
military capabilities to become a great sea power. 
The speed of India’s aircraft carrier acquisition has captured international 
attention and no doubt projected its position as a great sea power. The Indian Navy is the 
fourth largest in the world and one of the great sea powers that owns aircraft carriers and 
nuclear submarines.145 Nowadays, the Indian Navy has owned two aircraft carriers to 
dominate the Indian Ocean since the INS Vikramaditya was commissioned in 2013. India, 
Italy, and the United States are the only states that own more than one aircraft carrier in 
the world.146 India’s ambition is demonstrated in the New York Times’ headline: “Land of 
Gandhi Asserts Itself as Global Military Power.” 147  According to the news report, 
William S. Cohen, a secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, contends that 
“India sees itself in a different light—not looking so much inward and looking at 
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Pakistan, but globally.” 148 A state that owns aircraft carriers can deploy its military 
strength anywhere around the world using its elaborate aircraft carrier battle group. In 
other words, the aircraft carrier is a means to enhance global influence.  
Establishing a robust Navy is one of best ways to become a great power because 
more than 70 percent of the earth’s surface is covered by ocean. According to the 
comparison of characteristics and capabilities of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, 
the Navy is the most powerful way to deploy a state’s armed forces around the world and 
extends a state’s homeland and power. For example, Ladwig points out that “the Indian 
Navy has undertaken several high-profile deployments to the South China Sea and the 
Persian Gulf,” and he contends that such deployments are significant signs of India’s sea 
power across the Indian-Pacific region. 149  Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee made a speech in International Relations and Maritime Affairs to claim how 
significant India’s Navy is: “Within the larger maritime canvas, it is our nation’s military 
maritime power—as embodied by the Indian Navy . . . that is the enabling instrument that 
allows all the other components of maritime power to be exercised.”150 Along the same 
lines, Admiral Sureesh Mehta proudly claim the significance of India’s blue water 
capability after he served as chief of Naval Staff: “Our ships have to be placed at distant 
places. If our ships are present far away from home, we can do something to raise the 
prestige of the nation.” 151  Accordingly, the norms model is one of the strongest 
explanations for India’s program of constructing its aircraft carriers. 
3. Domestic-Politics Model 
India’s domestic-politics support is critical evidence that has underpinned its 
maritime power expansion since the Post-Cold War. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
and Congress-led government claim that India should put more focus on the Navy instead 
of a Cinderella service among armed forces. Different ruling parts hold the same policy 
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of naval modernization, and both of them won public support to implement their policy 
because the Indian people are proud of these accomplishments. After all, constructing an 
aircraft carrier is difficult because few people or states have the expertise to do so. INS 
Vikrant, India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, will be a source of pride that 
demonstrates the state’s hegemonic power and its robust economy, as well as the skillful 
knowledge of its people and its advanced technology. Jaswant Singh is an Indian 
politician who asserts that naval neglect was a sad case before the 1990s. He says that 
“Today, the India navy faces a crisis in terms of its rapidly declining force levels, lack of 
sufficient funding, and limited warship construction programs.”152 His Prime Minister, 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a leader of BJP, also aimed at building “blue water” capacity and 
decided to increase funding and naval modernization.153 Even in May 2004, Manmohan 
Singh, the Congress-led administration, continually adopted the policy of shaping a blue-
water navy. The Indian government increased the IN’s defense budget from $7.5 billion 
for the years 1997–2001 to $18.3 billion for 2002–2007. Additionally, IN’s share of the 
defense budget had increased from 11.2 percent in 1992–93 to 18.26 percent in 2007–
08.154 These political elites all played important roles to drive India’s maritime expansion.  
Besides Indian political elites, naval senior officers make efforts to push the 
Indian Navy’s modernization and to win the aircraft carriers debate among different 
military branches. For example, The Times of India reports a senior naval officer’s point 
of view that shows blue-water capability is imperative: “We have proved the Navy can be 
used as a diplomatic instrument in support of our political and geo-strategic objectives. 
Unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy is a trans-national force, not circumscribed by 
a country’s international boundaries or airspace.”155 The Indian Air Force (IAF) worries 
that its budget might be transferred to the IN, which exposes IN’s vulnerability, that is 
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“aircraft carriers can be sunk, while a shore-based airfield cannot be.”156 Navy planners 
counter IAF with stronger viewpoints to protect the Navy’s interests in maritime 
modernization. Naval officers argue that Navy fighters can take off from aircraft carriers 
within less than five minutes to attack any shore-based fighters before the enemy spends 
two hours flying to approach carriers. Vice Admiral Anup Singh even argues that the 
Navy should possess its own fighters and train skills of maritime flying, and IN doubts 
IAF’s capability to support maritime operations.  
Furthermore, bureaucratic factors also drive India’s naval modernization. The 
aircraft carrier option is unaffordable for most states due to limited budget and skill 
deficiencies. Comparatively speaking, China acquired its first aircraft carrier very late—
in September 2012—because China’s economy and technology might not have been 
advanced enough to possess an aircraft carrier in the early 1970s.157 However, nowadays, 
India’s indigenous shipbuilding and defense industries are skillful and knowledgeable 
enough to support and push IN’s program of modernization. India’s capabilities in 
shipbuilding industries are impressive at various levels. These industries indigenously 
build Delhi-class destroyers, not to mention frigates. Meanwhile, India is conducting its 
indigenous nuclear submarine and indigenous aircraft carrier project. The progress of the 
military-related industries is one of the requirements to drive India’s naval modernization. 
4. Conclusion  
Compared with the norms and domestic-politics models, the security model is the 
most appropriate explanation for why India wants high budget expenditures to expand its 
maritime capabilities. The Indian Navy may want to enlarge its size and modernize its 
weapons to gain powerful deterrence and sea control. India needs sea power to deter its 
hostile neighbors, especially emerging sea powers like China, and aircraft carriers can 
provide many capabilities of a great maritime power. China is India’s biggest threat 
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because of its string of pearls’ strategy and economic dependence on the Indian Ocean. 
Therefore, India’s previous conflicts and crises with China create fear and distrust that 
contribute to its sea power expansion, and aircraft carriers are powerful weapons to 
enforce sea denial and to provide catastrophic punishment, if necessary. Additionally, 
India may use robust aircraft carrier fleets to control the Indian Ocean and to protect its 
trade and natural energy on its SLOC. Geographically, India needs aircraft carriers to 
safeguard its maritime interests across the whole Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf to 
the Strait of Malacca and even beyond. Accordingly, India has to expand its sea power to 
deter the rising threat of Chinese expansion and to provide security of the SLOC. 
The security model alone, however, is inadequate to explain India’s sea power 
expansion; the norms and domestic-politics models are two jigsaw puzzle pieces that 
bring the whole picture of India’s maritime expansion into focus. With regard to the 
norms model, India’s aircraft carriers symbolize a great sea power. Besides India’s 
national identity, India could use indigenous aircraft carriers to symbolize its 
technologically advanced state as well. Additionally, domestic-politics contribution to 
India’s sea power expansion cannot be ignored. India’s naval senior officers try their best 
to win the debate over aircraft carriers and to persuade political elites into legislating a 
blue water policy. Furthermore, India’s capabilities of military-related industries can 
support policy makers in expanding maritime capabilities. Accordingly, one model 
cannot fully explain the reason why a state continuously expands its sea power. Although 
the security model provides the best single explanation of India’s naval expansion, a 




What motivates India to expand its military capability? The evidence 
demonstrated in this thesis suggests that security concerns are a stronger explanation than 
the norms and domestic-politics models. The three models—the security, the norms, and 
the domestic-politics models—are all indispensable pieces to the puzzle of explaining 
India’s military expansion. More specifically, the causes discussed in these three models 
are interrelated and affect one another in a sometimes cyclical pattern. However, this 
thesis suggests that the security model is the biggest piece of the jigsaw puzzle in 
explaining the whole picture of India’s military expansion.  
In regard to India’s overall nuclear weapons and delivery systems, all three 
models are applicable, but the security model explains the most. India’s distrust of its 
neighbors has provoked its survival instinct, which is the security concern that initially 
motivated the nuclear program. China and Pakistan are two of the biggest potential 
threats that India faces, and these threats continually motivate India’s development of 
nuclear arsenals and also multiple delivery systems and platforms, such as ballistic 
missiles and sea-based launchers. However, India’s nuclear program would not continue 
without domestic factors like public support, bureaucratic sustenance, and the national 
sentiment of anti-colonialism. In terms of the norms model, these domestic factors 
encourage the government to pursue methods that will enhance India’s status as a great 
power and further fuel the population’s desire to support India. This status as a great 
power is what India wants when its economy is rising and global influence is needed. 
Furthermore, other aspects of domestic-politics influence India to expand its military. For 
example, once India’s nuclear-related organizations or laboratories were technologically 
advanced enough to support nuclear weapons, scientists started pushing further to ensure 
that their budgetary support and positive reputation would continue. Additionally, India’s 
political elites discovered that nuclear issues could enhance their public support, causing 
them to make nuclear decisions.  
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The development of India’s conventional weapons, such as its aircraft carriers, 
can be explained in a similar manner to its nuclear program; the security model is the best 
explanation, but all three models are required for a comprehensive understanding. India 
uses aircraft carriers to provide robust deterrence against China and to secure sea control 
across the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific Ocean. India’s fears do not just derive 
from China’s rise and previous conflicts, but also from any threats to its seaborne 
shipping globally. Beyond the security considerations, the norms and domestic-politics 
models also explain India’s military expansion. India’s aircraft carriers clearly symbolize 
a great power by demonstrating a strong military and advanced technology. This symbol 
bolsters the Indian population’s confidence, strengthening nationalism and fueling the 
anti-imperialist sentiment. A confident public then supports policymakers to continually 
push naval modernization. This cycle encourages India to expand its maritime 
capabilities. However, India’s aircraft carriers are the best viable option for its maritime 
security area, which extends across the vast expanse from the Western Indian Ocean to 
the Eastern Pacific Ocean. Instead, India already has considerable high-tech equipment to 
demonstrate its prestige around the world, such as ballistic missiles and space exploration 
programs.  
Although the two case studies of India’s nuclear weapons and its conventional 
weapon, aircraft carriers, may not be enough to explain India’s military expansion overall, 
these are the two most powerful and expensive weapons and therefore demonstrate most 
of India’s policymakers’ logic in their decision-making. India’s cases can be explained by 
a combination of security, norms, and domestic-politics models. Although the security, 
the norms, and the domestic-politics models all explain India’s military expansion to 
some degree, the analysis of these two cases suggests that the security model has the most 
explanatory power. 
B. IMPLICATION FOR THE REGION—SOUTH ASIA’S FUTURE 
INSTABILITY 
For India, military expansion has multiple causes as demonstrated by the security, 
norms, and domestic-politics perspective. This expansion can only continue as long as the 
country’s economy supports it. Furthermore, this expansion could result in a security 
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dilemma that provokes its hostile neighbors toward an arms race. That is to say, India’s 
behavior of military expansion might destabilize the region of South Asia.  
Many scholars debate whether nuclear and conventional expansion will affect 
South Asia’s stability. For example, Kenneth Waltz and Sumit Ganguly believe that 
“nuclear weapons do not make nuclear war likely” because “nuclear weapons threaten to 
make conflict catastrophically costly.”158 On the other hand, S. Paul Kapur and Scott 
Sagan argue that “India and Pakistan face a dangerous nuclear future” because “new 
proliferators will lead to deterrence failures and accidental uses of nuclear weapons.”159 
Beyond nuclear weapons expansion, conventional power expansion and uncompromising 
struggles of territorial disputes among India, China, and Pakistan put the region’s future 
in danger. India, China, and Pakistan are the only three states in the world that are not 
conducting nuclear disarmaments and are in fact increasing their nuclear arsenals.160 In 
addition, India, China, and Pakistan have been the top three arms importers for the past 
five years since 2009.161 Particularly, India and China are already the two largest blue 
naval powers around the region. This thesis argues that South Asia will become more 
unstable in the next 10 to 15 years because of organizational errors, the rising demand of 
natural energy, and deterrence failures. 
1. Organizational Errors  
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in an organization are a good way to save 
time and cost, but they are not always applicable to every crisis. Graham Allison and 
Philip Zelikow claim that “SOPs constitute routines for dealing with standard situation,” 
but “critical instances that typically do not have ‘standard’ characteristics, are often 
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handled sluggishly or inappropriately.” 162  Rational decision makers will set goals, 
prioritize crises, think of possible outcomes, and choose the best outcome for the final 
decision. For example, if Kennedy followed SOPs, he would have never phoned 
Khrushchev directly and brought peace to both sides. Accordingly, following SOPs could 
occasionally lead to the wrong decision, and this might destabilize the region because 
tensions might escalate to a full-scale nuclear war or brutal conventional war.  
Additionally, one state’s SOPs or doctrines could cause regional instability 
between hostile states because of another state’s misunderstanding and overreactions. For 
instance, India’s Cold Start military doctrine, which divided its three main strike corps 
into eight “integrated battle groups” (IBGs) and currently allows these eight IBGs to 
efficiently combine armed forces and launch attacks into Pakistan, triggers danger 
between India and Pakistan for two reasons.163 First, Pakistan’s fear of threats to its 
security may make regional instability worse. Pakistan is a comparatively weak adversary 
that will highly enhance its military alertness. Similarly, India will remain ready for a 
military response from Pakistan. Therefore, the doctrine would exacerbate regional 
tension. 
Second, the Cold Start doctrine could easily and quickly escalate Indo-Pakistani 
crises into a large-scale conventional war, or perhaps even a nuclear war. In regard to 
conventional war, Vijay Oberoi in India, Pakistan, and the Bomb suggests that the Cold 
Start doctrine “makes political will [of the decision to attack Pakistan] more likely to be 
there, since now we can mobilize before world opinion comes down on political leaders 
and prevents them from acting.”164 In terms of nuclear war, India’s doctrinal change 
forces Pakistan to depend on nuclear weapons’ deterrence due to the conventional power 
asymmetry. Accordingly, the Cold Start may destabilize South Asia. Most importantly, if 
a territorial dispute or conflict breaks out, nuclear war may become a reality. 
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The prevalence of nuclear and conventional weapons would be the earth’s ticking 
time bomb—accidents are likely to happen.165 Waltz believes that “we have enjoyed half 
a century of nuclear peace, but we can never have a guarantee.” 166  Regional or 
international instability could escalate to full-scale nuclear war due to the prevalence of 
nuclear weapons or accidental launches. Beyond nuclear weapons, advanced technology 
like the powerful ballistic missile could produce catastrophic destruction. Moreover, the 
criteria or procedures for launching a missile differ by regime type and by operator. In 
military-led states, such as Pakistan, command and control of missiles could be loose, and 
some states might shoot mistakenly because of inadequate training.  
Furthermore, the international community would be mistaken if it passively 
allowed instability to develop among India, China, and Pakistan. For example, Kapur 
mentions that jihadis or terrorists in Pakistan might steal nuclear or conventional weapons 
during their transportation in extreme situations because insiders or spies divulge the 
transport schedules.167 That is to say, Pakistani terrorists would likely seek opportunities 
to obtain nuclear weapons and could potentially attack any city around India. For 
example, Sagan notes that Al Qaida has recruited senior Pakistani nuclear scientists to 
assist in developing bombs.168 Terrorists are radical groups that do not respect civilian 
life when attempting to achieve their organization’s goals. This is the lesson we learned 
from the 2008 Mumbai attacks.  
In addition, the possession of nuclear weapons among India, China, and Pakistan 
is risky and dangerous because of “preemptive instability.”169 A small and weak nuclear 
state like Pakistan may fear its robust conventional enemy, India—especially the state’s 
first strike capabilities and its aggressive invasion tactics. Therefore, Pakistan’s fear 
might produce a nuclear first strike strategy to prevent it from being annihilated by 
stronger adversaries. Accordingly, Devin Hagerty points out that some scholars firmly 
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expect “that the next time nuclear weapons are fired—either in anger or inadvertently—it 
will be the result of a crisis between two Third World states with small nuclear 
forces.”170 
2. Rising Demand of Natural Energy  
India and China’s dependence on oil and gas contribute to their maritime power 
expansion, and this sea power expansion is leading them toward a risky future. The arms 
race of sea power expansion between India and China seems white-hot—one that appears 
to have begun in 2013 when China’s first carrier, Liaoning, completed testing. 
Coincidentally, India commissioned its aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, the same year 
and capitalized on its indigenous carrier to reply to China’s purchase. In addition, China 
is building its second and first indigenous aircraft carrier, and some experts note that the 
“People’s Liberation Army Navy needs a total of four carriers by 2020.”171 On the other 
hand, India is not only constructing its third aircraft carrier but is planning to design 
another indigenous super carrier, the Vishal, which is scheduled to be commissioned by 
2025.172 That is to say, India and China will be two robust sea powers that might go 
head-to-head over the Indian Ocean in the next 10 to 15 years. 
Sea lines of control are the lifeline of India’s economy because the country’s trade 
and crude oil are heavily dependent on seaborne shipping. Kapur claims that “India’s 
impressive expansion has created an enormous need for energy.”173 About 90 percent of 
India’s goods are traded through the Indian Ocean.174 Additionally, about 70 percent of 
India’s oil and more than 50 percent of its natural gas are received from Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Kuwait, and Iraq.175 Thus, India’s energy mainly comes from the Persian Gulf, 
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which leaders view as “a primary national maritime interest.”176 Policymakers in India 
believe that “maritime security for supply lines and installations will remain a primary 
responsibility of the Indian Navy.”177 Furthermore, India’s maritime strategy explicitly 
notes that “whatever happens in the [Indian Ocean littoral region] can affect our national 
security and is of interest to us.”178 Accordingly, India and China might escalate conflicts 
to safeguard their own economic interests, making the region poised to experience 
instability in the next decade. 
3. Deterrence Failure 
Power asymmetry and nuclear weapons may destabilize South Asia in the future 
due to a deterrence failure between India and Pakistan. Professor Kapur’s perspective of 
strategic pessimism explains that “a weak, dissatisfied proliferator [like Pakistan] would 
challenge existing territorial arrangements [with India] in the belief that its insulation 
from all-out retaliation, and its ability to attract international attention, would afford it a 
significant chance of achieving its politico-military goals.”179 Nuclear deterrence might 
fail because Pakistani leaders believe that the country would obtain more benefits than 
losses if it launched a nuclear war with India. If an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war breaks out, 
Pakistan would become equal with India. On the other hand, India’s losses would be 
enormous and far greater than Pakistan’s. 
There are two conditions in South Asia that could encourage nuclear weapons to 
destabilize the region. First, Pakistan could use nuclear weapons as a shield against 
India’s superior conventional military capabilities. Nuclear weapons are a great equalizer 
for relatively small states such as Pakistan. In essence, nuclear weapons do not eradicate 
conflicts; on the contrary, they put South Asia under the high risk of full-scale nuclear 
war. Waltz believed that India and Pakistan would share sustained peace after their 
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nuclear test in 1998.180 However, the casualties rose in number after 1998’s test. For 
example, the Kargil War in 1999 left more than 1,000 dead from conventional warfare. 
Additionally, Kapur’s main thesis is that “nuclear weapons have played an important role 
in destabilizing the subcontinent.”181 In other words, nuclear weapons did not pull India 
and Pakistan back from the brink of war but led them to another, more dangerous, 
conflict. 
Second, in India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, Kapur contends that nuclear weapons 
“could create diplomatic incentives for a weak, dissatisfied state to engage in 
destabilizing behavior.”182 The intervention of a third party, such as the United States or 
the UN, for a weak state could affect bilateral negotiations with a strong state. Pakistan is 
dissatisfied about what it considers an unfair allotment of resources and power, and this 
uneven distribution also leads to a power asymmetry between India and Pakistan. 
Therefore, the territorially dissatisfied and militarily weak Pakistan may have a 
diplomatic incentive to provoke a nuclear crisis to receive more attention from the 
international community. In terms of the Kargil War in 1998 and the border crisis in 2001, 
Pakistan successfully caught the United States’ attention and ended all wars. Accordingly, 
Pakistan’s economy and conventional forces are weak, but nuclear weapons provide 
Pakistan with a voice to draw the attention of the third party to accomplish its goal and to 
destabilize the subcontinent. 
4. Conclusion  
South Asia’s enduring territorial disputes, combined with its expansion of 
conventional and nuclear power, produce fear, uncertainty, and tension among the rivals 
of India, China, and Pakistan. Organizational problems may further destabilize the region 
due to the SOPs of different countries, the Cold Start doctrine, and human errors. 
Individual SOPs are not always right for every situation, and India’s doctrinal changes 
may have destabilizing effects on South Asia. Human errors, which include accidents and 
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the actions of terrorists, may also contribute to regional instability. Furthermore, the arms 
race between India and China could trigger dangerous crises. While the consumption of 
oil and gas has led to India and China’s economic growth, the security of natural energy 
is now critical and has triggered Indo-Sino naval power expansion. This arms race has 
resulted in weapons expansion and increased tensions in the Indian Ocean. Since 
Pakistan’s conventional power is weaker than India’s, nuclear power could become 
Pakistan’s shield to achieve its politico-military goals. Through its provocative behavior, 
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